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ABSTRACT 
 
The study investigates if the level of investment opportunities reduces the positive impact 
of expropriation incentive on the level of overinvestments. Under the condition of capital 
constraint, high incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate firms’ wealth do not 
necessarily result in overinvesments if firms have abundant investment opportunities. The 
study also examine if positive investment-cash flow sensitivity still exists after a 
significant corporate governance reforms in Indonesia. The study finds no positive 
relation between investments and cash flow. It documents that  overinvestments primarily 
occur in firms whose controlling shareholders have small ownership. Further, it 
documents that higher investment opportunities mitigate the effect of expropriaton 
incentive on overinvestments.  
 
Keywords: expropriation incentive, investment-cash flow sensitivity, investment 
opportunities, overinvestment 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The objectives of the study are: first, to investigate if positive cash-flow 
investment sensitivity in general exists in Indonesia, more than ten years after the 
East Asian financial crisis; second, to examine if such sensitivity predominantly 
is a result of overinvestments caused by expropriation incentive by controlling 
shareholders and; third, to investigate whether overinvestments primarily occur in 
firms with bad prospect (i.e., low investment opportunities). 
 
One explanation of the positive relation between level of investments and 
operating cash flow is the existence of asymmetric information and capital 
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market imperfection. Capital market imperfections and asymmetric information 
cause financial constrain to the firm and consequently, the cost of external 
financing is more expensive than cost of internal financing.  Managers must rely 
on internal cash flow to finance the firm’s projects and thus if firm faces a 
limitation in cash flow or financial constraint, managers tend to pass up a positive 
a positive net present value projects. Thus, a positive relationship between cash 
flow and investment is an indication of underinvestment (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hubbard (1998), Ağca and Mozumdar 
(2008) show that firms with high level of financial constraints tend to have higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (i.e. their investment are more profound to cash 
flow). 
 
However, a recent study conducted by Chen and Chen (2012) that 
employ U.S. listed firms as the samples find that the positive investment-cash 
flow sensitivity has disappeared recently. They suggest given that financial 
constraints still profound, the positive investment-cash flow relation found in the 
past cannot be attributed by financial constraints. They suggest alternative 
explanations for the disappearance, but in the end they conclude that there is no 
definite answer and the cause for the disappearance remains a puzzle. 
 
Since the ownership structure of U.S. listed firms typically is highly 
dispersed, Chen and Chen (2012) do not consider the effect of ownership 
structure on investment-cash flow sensitivity as addressed by Wei and Zhang 
(2008) and explained as follow. Degryse and de Jong (2006) and Wei and Zhang 
(2008) provide alternative view about a positive relationship between cash flow 
and firm’s capital investments. The view focuses on the manifestation of agency 
problem in firm capital investment (Jensen, 1986; 1993). Large free cash flow in 
a firm induces managers to squander it for their own private benefit. The 
managers tend to overspend their cash flow to unprofitable projects (i.e., 
overinvestment) if they convince there will be more assets under their control.  
Thus,  a positive relationship between cash flow and investment is an indication 
of overinvestment or empire-building.  
 
Wei and Zhang (2008) suggest that firms in the U.S. and East Asian 
countries reveal strongly positive investment cash-flow sensitivities but based on 
different reasons. In the U.S. firms, the result supports the underivestment 
hypothesis caused by asymmetric information (Hadlock, 1998), meanwhile in 
East Asian firms, the empirical finding supports the overinvestment hypothesis 
caused by agency costs of free cash flow (Wei & Zhang, 2008). Wei and Zhang 
(2008) argue that this difference in empirical finding may be caused by the 
difference in the agency problem that each economy faces. In the U.S., the 
conflict of interest is between managers and shareholders, while the agency 
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problem in East Asia primarily is due to the conflict of interest between 
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders.  
 
Controlling shareholders are encouraged to exproriate non-controlling 
shareholders (through among others overinvestment) if the their control rights are 
higher than their cash flow rights (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). Thus, the 
incentive to expropriate increases as cash flow rights decreases and as the 
difference between control rights and cash flow rights (i.e., cash flow leverage) 
increases. Wei and Zhang (2008) then hypothesise that overinvestments 
(underinvestments) exist when the positive relation between cash flow and 
investment decreases as cash flow rights increases (decreases), or when cash flow 
leverage decreases (increases). Using the period of the study (year 1991–1996) 
before the East Asian financial crisis, their findings are consistent with the 
overinvestment hypothesis and thus, they conclude that the positive association 
between cash flow and investment in East Asian countries (including Indonesia) 
is due to overinvestment resulting from expropriation of controlling shareholders. 
 
After the crisis, governments in the region (including Indonesia) 
introduced a number of regulations intended to improve corporate governance 
practices of listed companies in the region. The World Bank assessments on 
corporate governance mechanism at the country level in the region indicate 
significant improvements in the past decade1. As suggested by Wei and Zhang 
(2008), future research needs to examine if the improvement in the quality of 
corporate governance (henceforth, CG) mechanisms alone has changed the 
investment behaviors of East Asian companies.  
 
Based on the above explanation, our study aims to examine if in Indonesia 
there still exists a positive relation between investment and cash flow. We also 
examine if in Indonesia overinvestment still dominates after a number of CG 
improvement initiatives were introduced.  
 
Other stream of studies examine the relation between over or 
underinvestment problem and the level investment opportunities. Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Schafstein (1991) suggest that firms with good prospect (i.e., high Tobin’s 
Q) tend to have asymetric information problem while firms with poor prospect 
(i.e., low Tobin’s Q) tend to have agency problem. Degryse and de Jong (2006) 
then examine if in the Netherland, the positive invesment-cash flow sensitivity 
primarily exists in firms with poor prospect (low Tobin’s Q) or firms with good 
prospect (high Tobin’s Q). They find that investment cash-flow sensitivity for 
firms with low investment opportunities is higher than those with high 
investment opportunities, suggesting that overinvestment problem tend to 
dominate underinvestment problem in the Netherland.  
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We extend Wei and Zhang (2008) and Degryse and Jong (2006) by 
examining if overinvesments resulting from incentive to expropriate primarily 
exists in firms with bad prospect. As firm prospect improves, there are abundance 
of value creating investment opportunities. Given capital constraints, even though 
controlling shareholders have high incentive to expropriate, they will first take 
investments with positive NPV and may not take those investments with negative 
NPV. On the other hand, for firms with bad prospect, there are only few 
investments with positive NPV, and thus it’s more likely for them to invest in 
projects with negative NPV. Therefore, the positive effect of incentive to 
expropriate on overinvestment is stronger in firms with bad prospects than those 
with good prospect.  
 
Indonesian listed firms are selected as the sample of the study for the 
following reasons. The Indonesian company law (Undang-Undang No. 40 
Perseroan Terbatas) requires companies to adopt dual board structure: the Board 
of Directors that manage the company and the Board of Commissioners (BOC) 
that oversees the Board of Directors (BOD). The ownership structure of almost 
all listed companies in Indonesia are highly concentrated and many of them have 
pyramid ownership structures2.  Thus, controlling shareholders of majority of the 
companies effectively determine members of the BOC as well as BOD. Under 
this setting, an independent oversight of BOC on BOD may be hampered and 
thus, listed firms may be managed primarily for the interests of controlling 
shareholders, which along the way may detriment non-controlling shareholders. 
 
 One cause of the East Asian financial crisis is poor corporate governance 
practice in the region and during the East Asian financial crisis, Indonesia was 
the hardest hit country with the record of minus 13% in GNP growth.  After the 
crisis, a number of rules have been enacted in Indonesia to reduce the opportunity 
of controlling shareholders to expropriate the wealth of non-controlling 
shareholders. These rules include, among others, the revision of the company law 
that provides more protection to shareholders, the requirement of having 
independent commissioners at least 30% of total commissioners in the Board of 
Commissioners, the establishment of audit committee whose members are 
entirely independent, the requirement that conflict of interest transactions are 
approved by those independent of the transaction, extensive disclosure of related 
party transactions, etc. These initiatives if effectively enforced suggest that the 
likelihood of expropriation through overinvestment should decrease after the 
Asian crisis. On the other hand, enforcement of the rules is still a major problem 
in Indonesia, as suggested by some surveys3. Further, although Indonesia revised 
its CG Code in year 2006 to be in line with international best CG practices, the 
adoption of the code to listed companies is voluntary, making the code may not 
be effective in improving CG practices of the companies4. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, until now the divergence between control and cash-flow rights 
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still prevail in most listed companies in Indonesia and relative to other 
neighbouring countries, the disclosure of ultimate owners is relatively opaque. 
Therefore, it is an empirical question to examine if after more than 10 years 
investment-cash flow sensitivity due to overinvestment still exists, exists only for 
certain type of firms, or does not exist at all.    
 
Using year 2005 to 2008 as the period of the study and manufacturing 
firms as the samples of our study, we find that in general there is no significant 
positive relation between investment and cash flow for listed firms in Indonesia. 
This finding is in line with Chen and Chen (2012). We document that positive 
investment-cash flow sensitivity exists for firms whose controlling shareholders 
have low cash-rights, suggesting that overinvestment problem occur for firms 
whose controlling shareholders have low alignment incentive. When we examine 
if the relation is affected by the interaction between cash-flow rights/cash-flow 
leverage and firm prospect, we find that for firms with very low prospect and 
high risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders, overinvestment is taking 
place. 
 
Our study extends the study of Wei and Zhang (2008) by showing that the 
effect of cash-flow right/cash flow leverage on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
depends on firm prospect. We also extend Degryse and Jong (2006) by 
demonstrating that investment opportunities have not only a direct effect on 
investment cash flow sensitivity but also a moderating effect on the relation 
between expropriation incentive and investment cash flow sensitivity. Further, 
we document that ten years after the East Asian financial crisis, on average listed 
firms in Indonesia do not exhibit positive investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 
   
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The following section elaborates hypotheses to be tested. The first hypothesis 
examines if there is a positive relation between investment and cash flow among 
listed firms in Indonesia. The second and third hypotheses identify whether either 
underinvestment or overinvestment primarily explains the positive investment 
cash flow sensitivity. The identification is by examining the effect of 
expropriation incentive on the investment cash flow sensitivity. The fourth 
hypothesis tests if investment cash flow sensitivy is more positive in firms with 
low investment opportunities than in firms with high investment opportunities 
firms. If it does, it indicates that overinvestment is still a major problem in 
Indonesia. The fifth hypothesis, which reflects the main contribution of the study, 
examines if the effect of expropriation incentive on the investment cash flow 
sensitivity depends on investment opportunities. 
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Background 
 
Existing studies suggest that the positive relationship between cash flow and 
investment can be explained based on two arguments, i.e., agency problems 
resulting in overinvesment or asymmetric information problem resulting in 
underinvestment. The following two paragraphs explain the arguments for the 
relationships. 
 
 Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) show the agency problem in capital 
budgeting where firms with more cash flow will make more investment than 
firms with lower cash holdings. Further, Taggart (1987), Brealey and Myers 
(2000), and Harris and Raviv (1996; 1998) also find that managers tend to 
entrench themselves through increasing firm size and more assets under their 
control. Wei and Zhang (2008) also show that overinvestment due to the agency 
problem is not only caused by the conflict between shareholders and managers 
but also by the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. 
Thus, the capital budgeting decision made by managers and/or controlling 
shareholders may not intend to maximise the firm value. 
 
At the same time, Fazzari et al. (1988); Hoshi et al. (1991); and Hubbard 
(1998) assert that the existence of information-driven capital market 
imperfections impede the external financing through the capital market because 
the cost of capital is expensive. If the capital market market is perfect, internal 
cash flow of the firm should not be related to corporate fixed investment. 
Consequently, the “most constrained” firms are more sensitive to internal cash 
flow in financing their investment expenditure than “less constrained” firms. Wei 
and Zhang (2008) also corroborate that the financial constraint caused by the 
imperfection of capital market induce  the  firm to rely on internal financing and 
may pass up a value-maximising project or underinvestment. Therefore, there is a 
positive relationship between a firm cash flow and investment. 
 
As explained in the previous part, in the past 15 years, a significant 
number of rules have been enacted to improve corporate governance practice in 
Indonesia, including to reduce the likelihood of wealth expropriation of non-
controlling shareholders. In year 2000, the Capital Market Regulator requires that 
material conflict of interest transactions have to be approved by independent 
shareholders at the General Meeting of Shareholders. In addition, in year 2008 
companies have to publicly announce material related party transactions. Both 
regulations require publication of the opinion of independent valuers regarding 
the fairness of the transactions and the statement by Board of Commissioners and 
Board of Directors that no misstatement in the disclosures of the announcement. 
Extensive disclosures regarding related party transactions also have to be 
provided in the notes to financial statements, such as the value, nature and the 
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counter party of the transactions as well as the statement if the transactions are 
conducted at arm’s length. 
 
In addition to the regulator, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also 
conduct advocacies and education to promote good governance practices among 
listed companies in Indonesia. For example, National Committee on Governance 
Policy which was established after the economic crisis in 1998 is in charge for 
producing codes of corporate governance for companies in general and also codes 
for various sectors in the economy. The Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Directorship was established in year 2001 and its activities are providing 
corporate governance and directorship and corporate governance training to 
commissioners and directors and conducting research on corporate governance 
practices in Indonesia. Annually it conducts assessment of corporate governance 
practices of listed companies and the results are provided to the Capital Market 
Regulators as feedback for improving corporate governance practices of listed 
companies. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
As explained earlier, both financing constraints which result in underinvestment 
problem and agency conflicts which give rise to overinvestment problem bring 
about a positive investment-cash flow sensitivity. The implication is that if 
financing constraints become less pronounced and/or agency conflicts can be 
mitigated by better oversight by the regulator then the positive investment-cash 
flow sensitivity may decline. 
 
 As explained above, after the East Asian crisis, the capital market 
regulator has enacted a number of rules aiming to improve corporate governance 
practices of listed companies in Indonesia. As a result of these initiatives, as 
assesed by the World Bank (2010), the average corporate governance score of 
Indonesia in year 2009 improves significantly relative to the score in year 2004. 
The assesment primarily focuses on the quality of regulation; while the 
enforcement of the rules remains a challenge in Indonesia. The capital market 
regulator has also enacted  a number of regulations to reduce market imperfection 
and asymmetric information in the capital market. As a consequence, the trading 
value of stocks jumped by almost 9 times between year 2000 to 2008.  
 
 Chen and Chen (2012) provide an alternative explanation on the possible 
no relation between investments and cash flow. They argue that the positive 
relation between cash flow and investments found in the previous studies may be 
due to the fact that current cash flow is reflecting future profitability while the 
level of investment is an increasing function of future profitability. Over time, as 
a result of an increasing importance of research and development (R&D) 
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activities and intangible assets in determining future profitability, current cash 
flow is becoming less correlated with future profitability and as a result no 
positive relation between investment and cash flow is observed. They find 
however that this explanation cannot totally explain the disappearance of positive 
investment-cash flown sensitivity in the U.S. 
 
 R&D activities are not yet playing major roles in creating value for 
manufacturing firms in Indonesia since many of the firms are still relying on 
imported technologies of the production process5. We expect that the increasing 
role of R&D activities is not as strong as that in the U.S. and thus its impact on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity should not be substantial. 
 
In conclusion, initiatives to improve corporate governance practice and to 
reduce capital market imperfection as well as the increasing role of R&D 
activities should reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivity; however, relatively 
weak enforcement of the rules and insubstantial role of R&D expenditures in 
Indonesia imply that positive investment-cash flow sensitivity still exists. Based 
on above explanation, we offer no prediction with the direction of the hypothesis 
and thus we posit the following alternative form of hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: There is a positive relation between the level of investments 
and cash flow. 
   
Hypothesis 2 
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2001) investigate the effect of ownership structure on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Using large outside shareholders, institutional 
shareholders, and insider ownership as a proxy of the ownership structure, they 
test how the the ownerhsip structure may align the interest of managers and other 
shareholders and also the suboptimal investment (i.e., overinvestment or 
underinvestment) can be reduced. Their results show that the presence of large 
outside shareholders reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivy because they 
monitor the manager from expropriating the firm’s free cash flow and reduce the 
asymmetric information between managers and other shareholders.  
 
Their findings apply to the firms with dispersed ownership meanwhile in 
Indonesia, the ownership structure is characterised by concentrated ownership so 
the primary agency problems is not between managers and shareholders but 
between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. In fact, the 
existence of large shareholders at some point may raise another problems where 
they tend to expropriate the minority shareholders to reap the private benefit. This 
argument is also addressed by Goergen and Renneboog (2001) who find the 
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positive relationship between cash flow and investment spending when large 
share stakes are controlled by industrial companies. 
  
Wei and Zhang (2008) focus on the agency problems between the 
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders and how the ownership 
structure affects the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Wei and Zhang (2008) use 
cash flow-rights and control rights of controlling shareholders suggested by 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) to indicate the alignment and 
expropriation or entrenchment effect of the presence of controlling shareholders. 
The alignment between controlling shareholders’ interest and non-controlling 
shareholders’ interest increases as cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders get 
higher. As a result, overinvestment tends to decrease. On the other hand, the 
higher level of divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of 
controlling shareholders increases the entrenchment motive of controlling 
shareholders toward noncontrolling shareholders. As a consequence, 
overinvestment problem becomes more exacerbated. Therefore, as in Wei and 
Zhang (2008) we state hypothesis related to the effect of ownership structure on 
the overinvestment problems as follows. 
 
H2: As a manifestation of overinvesment, the positive 
investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases as cash-flow rigths 
increase and as the divergence between control rights and cash-
flow rights decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
 
Based on Myers and Majluf (1984), Hadlock (1998) suggests and find that under 
asymmetric information problems in the capital market, managers who have 
strong incentive to maximise shareholder wealth tend to underinvest, which is 
reflected in postive investment cash-flow sensitivity. Based on their studies, Wei 
and Zhang (2008) suggest that underinvestment becomes more of a problem 
when the cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders is high or as the divergence 
between control rights and cash-flow rights is low. Higher cash-flow rights 
signify higher incentive of controlling shareholders to maximise firm value (i.e., 
their incentives are more aligned with non-controlling shareholders) and lower 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights results in less incentive for 
controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth of non-controlling shareholders. 
Under the condition of asymmetric information problems, this result in a more 
positive investment cash-flow sensitivity. 
 
Asymmetric information problems in the Indonesian capital and financial 
markets still persist even though some initiaves have been taken by the capital 
regulator to improve the transparency of the markets. The initiatives among 
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others are the mandatory requirement for public companies to have audit 
committee and more disclosure requirements in the annual report public 
companies in year 2006. Despite these initiatives, however, in term of corporate 
disclosure, in general the disclosures of public companies in Indonesia are still 
lower than those of Indonesia’s neighbouring countries6. The existence of 
asymmetric information eventually is reflected in the relatively high external cost 
of funds of Indonesian companies7. Under this condition, value maximising 
controlling shareholders prefer to utilise internal funds which is mirrored in the 
positive relation between the level of investment and internal cash-flow generated 
by the firms. Thus, as in Wei and Zhang (2008), the testable hypothesis is as 
follows. 
 
H3: As a manifestation of underinvestment, the positive 
investment-cash flow sensitivity increases as cash-flow rigths 
increase and as the divergence between control rights and cash-
flow rights decrease. 
 
Note that the first and the second hypotheses result in different prediction 
regarding the effect of ownership structure on investment cash-flow sensitivity. 
Thus, the empirical test for the the hypotheses will reveal which problem (agency 
problem or assymetric information problem) is more dominant among publicly 
listed firms in Indonesia. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
 
Hayashi (1982), Vogt (1994), and Degryse and Jong (2006) find that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity depend on the investment opportunities. 
Degryse and Jong (2006) argue that overinvestment exists in firms with bad 
prospects. The divergence of objectives between managers and shareholders 
cause the managers overinvest in negative present value projects to increase firm 
size even though it may jeopardise the shareholders’ wealth. This argument 
corroborates the agency problem of free cash flow hypothesis or managerial 
discretion problem theory as stated by Jensen (1986). Further, Degryse and Jong 
(2006) also support Myers and Majluf (1986) who argue that the asymmetric 
information between insiders (managers) and outside shareholders impede the 
firms to get the external financing and cause the underinvestment in firms with 
high growth or investment opportunities. Degryse and Jong (2006) find that firms 
with low investment opportunities have higher investment cash flow sensitivity 
than those with high investment opportunities, suggesting that overinvesment 
problem dominates the underinvestment problem.  
 
We expect the findings of Degryse and Jong (2006) are also aplicable to 
Indonesia. A number of studies in Indonesia (Kim, 2008; Utama & Handy, 2011; 
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Utama & Utama, 2014) find that publicly listed firms with high investment 
opportunies as proxied by the ratio of stock price to book value of equity per 
share tend to be better governed  than those with low investment opportunities. 
Using listed firms in emerging markets as their samples, Francis, Hasan and Song 
(2013) find that better governed firms face less financing constraints than poorly 
governed firms. Thus, the asymmetric information problems for firms with high 
investment opportunities are reduced by practicing better corporate governance. 
Utama and Utama (2014) also find that firms with low investment opportunities 
are significantly less profitable than those with high investment opportunities, 
indicating a more severe agency problem for the low investment opportunities 
firms. Practicing good corporate governance can reduce the negative impact of 
agency problem on firm performance (Utama & Handy, 2011; Utama & Musa, 
2011). However, since low investment opportunities firms are poorly governed, 
the agency problem faced by these firms are not reduced by their governance 
practice. Thus, in combination, we expect that in Indonesia, overinvestment 
problem dominates underinvestment problem. Based on the above explanation, 
we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Investment cash flow sensitivy is more positive in low 
investment opportunity firms than in high investment 
opportunity firms. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
 
Hypothesis two and three provide the impact of expropriation incentive and 
asymetric information problems on investment cash flow sensitivity regardless 
the level of investment opportunities, while hypothesis four explains the impact 
of investment opportunities on investment cash-flow sensitivity regardless the 
expropriation incentive. We posit that as the level of investment opportunities 
gets higher, the impact of incentive expropriation (asymetric information) on 
investment cash flow sensitivity gets lower (higher). The argument is as follows. 
 
 To maximise firm value, a manager should take all investments with 
positive net present value (NPV) while reject those with negative present value. 
Investments with positive NPVs increase the wealth of controlling shareholders 
and thus this rule applies regardless of the controlling shareholder’s incentive to 
expropriate the wealth of non-controlling shareholders. On the other hand, 
controlling shareholders with high incentive to expropriate may take investments 
with negative NPVs if these investments enable them to expropriate non-
controlling shareholders and as such increases their wealth. 
 
Firms have varying degree of investment opportunities (i.e., investments 
with positive NPV) and due to financial market imperfection, they face capital 
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constraints. For firms with good prospect, there are abundances of value creating 
investment opportunities that will increase controlling shareholders’ wealth and 
given capital constraints, investments with the highest NPV will be taken first 
before those with lower NPVs. This condition reduces their need to expropriate 
non-controlling shareholders by taking value destroying investments. As a result, 
even though controlling shareholders have high incentive to expropriate, they 
will be less likely to take those investments with negative NPV (i.e., less 
overinvestment). On the other hand, for firms with bad prospect, there are only 
few investments with positive NPV, and thus it’s more likely for them to invest 
in projects with negative NPV. Therefore, the positive effect of incentive to 
expropriate on overinvestment is stronger in firms with bad prospects than those 
with good prospect.  
 
 This line of reasoning is consistent with the study of Bae, Baek, Kang 
and  Liu (2012). They examine how expropriation incentive of controlling 
shareholders affect firm value during economic crisis and the subsequent 
recovery periods. They argue that during the economic crisis, because of poorer 
investment opportunities, controlling shareholders have stronger incentives to 
expropriate their firms for their own benefits. As the economy recovers, 
investment opportunities significantly improve. This improvement reduces 
controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate non-controlling shareholders. 
In line with the argument, they find that firms that are subject to controlling 
shareholders’ high expropriation incentives experience more decline in their 
value during crisis but perform better during the recovery period. 
 
 As explained earlier, Indonesian capital markets are far from perfect due 
to asymmetric information problem while at the same time the ownership 
structures of most listed companies are concentrated with large divergence of 
control rights over cash-flow rights. We posit that the combination of these two 
conditions aggravates the impact of the interaction between ownership structure 
and invesment opportunities on the investment cash-flow sensitivity. Based on 
the above argument, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: As investment opportunities improve, the effects of cash-
flow rights and the divergence between control rights and cash-
flow rights on the positive investment-cash flow sensitivity 
weaken. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample 
 
We restrict our samples to include only manufacturing firms because of these 
reasons, first, to control for the industry effect on variation in the level of 
investments, second, the variables used in this study (capital expenditures 
measured as change in net fixed assets, working capital, assets turnover) are 
primarily more suitable for manufacturing firms. 
 
Our main variables are cash-flow rights and control rights, and thus to be 
included in the sample, data on those variables should be available. In Indonesia, 
only shareholders with direct ownership of more than five percent are publicly 
dislcosed while in fact majority of controlling shareholders indirectly own listed 
companies through layers of company ownerships. Thus, to obtain the indirect 
ownership data for each company, one needs to hand collect them one by one in 
the Ministry of Justice. Many listed companies are owned by entities domiciled 
overseas and since the Ministry of Justice has ownership data only on companies 
domiciled in Indonesia, a large number of Indonesian listed companies whose 
owners are domiciled overseas have to be removed from the sample. Data on 
cash flow rights and control rights are obtained from Diyanti, Utama, Rossieta 
and Veronica (2010) and both measures are computed in according to Claessens 
et al. (2000). Diyanti et al. (2010) limit her samples to manufacturing firms that 
have data on cash-flow and control rights. Out of about 130 manufacturing listed 
firms in the Indonesian stock exchange, Diyanti et al. (2010) have complete 
ownership data on 98 firms or 294 firm-years during year 2005 through 2007. To 
increase the number of samples of our study, we extend the period to year 2008. 
Given that the ownership data is only until year 2007, we assume the ownership 
of listed firms in year 2008 is the same as in year 20078. With the addition of 
firms from year 2008, we employ 392 firm-years as the initial samples of our 
study. 
 
To be included in final sample, the data must meet these criteria:  
 
1. Firms must be listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISE)  
2. Firms must report audited financial statements annually from 2005 to 
2008 
3. Firms must not have a negative book value of equity (henceforth, BE) 
4. Firms have all data required for variables employed by this study 
 
Many firms have negative book value of equity and missing values on 
variables such as capital expenditure, working capital, assets, and sales and 
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consequently they need to be dropped. This results in final sample of 284 firm-
years from 78 corporations over the period of 2005–2008. 
 
We identify some outliers in some variables (the level of investments, 
change in working capital, price to book value and the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets). Rather than deleting them and losing some observations, we winsorize 
the values of the outliers to be the same as the highest/lowest values of 
observations not considered as outliers.  
 
Data for all variables other than ownership structure are obtained from 
OSIRIS database. 
 
Empirical Model and Measurement of Variables 
 
We employ the following empirical model to examine the existence of positive 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in our samples: 
 
0 1 , 1 2 3 4 5
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
it it it it it
i t it
i t i t i t i t i t
I CF DeltaNWC Sales Debt
PBV e
K K TA TA TA
     
    
          (1) 
 
where Iit, and CFit represent investment (the difference between net property, 
plant and equipment plus other fixed assets at the end of the year t minus 
previous year of net property plant and equipment plus other fixed assets) and 
cash flow from operating activities during period t, respectively; Ki,t-1 is the 
amount of fixed capital at the beginning of period t. 
 
Control variables are: As a proxy for investment opportunities we use 
PBVi,t-1 which is the ratio of stock price to book value of equity, calculated at the 
beginning of period t. Following Degryse and de Jong (2006), we employ two 
control variables: the change in net working capital and total sales, both scaled by 
total assets at the beginning period. Whited (1992) provides evidence that 
financially distressed firms have difficulties to obtain outside finance and this 
hampers their real investment expenditures. We measure debt ratio (total 
liabilities to total assets) as a measure of financial distress. 
 
The first hypothesis states a positive relation between cash flow and level 
of investment if there is under/overinvestment problem. Therefore,  we expect the 
coefficient of Cash Flow (i.e., β2) to be positive. 
 
To investigate the impact of the ownership structure on the investment-
cash flow sensitivity (Hypothesis 2 and 3), we use the following empirical model: 
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       
 
  (2) 
 
where CFRit-1 is cash flow rights, i.e. controlling shareholders’cash flow rights 
and CFLit-1is cash flow leverage which is the difference between the controlling 
shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights. Other variables are defined in 
Equation (1). 
 
If overinvestment resulting from agency problem has relatively stronger 
effect than underinvestment, then β3 will be negative and β4 will be positive, 
while if underinvestment problem dominates, β3 will be positive and β4 will be 
negative. 
 
To examine the impact of investment opportunities on the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity (hypothesis 4), the following model is employed: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 , 1 4 5 6
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
it it it it it it
it i t it
i t i t i t i t i t i t
I CF CF DeltaNWC Sales Debt
PBV PBV e
K K K TA TA TA
       
     
        
  (3) 
 
where all variables are explained in Equations (1) and (2). 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that investment cash flow sensitivy is more positive 
in low investment opportunity firms (low PBV) than in high investment 
opportunity firms (high PBV). Based on the hypothesis, if overinvestment 
problem in low PBV firms dominates underinvestment problem in high PBV 
firms, then  β3  will be negative. 
 
 To investigate the moderating effect of investment opportunities on the 
impact of ownership structure on investment-cash-flow sensitivity, we use the 
following empirical model: 
 
0 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 4 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
it it it it
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
I CF CF CF
PBV CFR CFL
K K K K
      
   
        
5 , 1 , 1 6 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1
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i t i t i t i t
i t i t
CF CF
CFR PBV CPL PBV
K K
    
 
       
7 8 9
, 1 , 1 , 1
it it it
it
i t i t i t
DeltaNWC Sales Debt
e
TA TA TA
  
  
     (4) 
 
where all variables are explained in Equations (1) and (2).  
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 Hypothesis 5 states that higher investment opportunities weaken the 
effects of cash-flow rights and the divergence between control rights and cash-
flow rights on the positive investment-cash flow sensitivity. According to 
hypothesis 5, β5 is positive while β6 is negative. 
 
Equation (4) involves a lot of interaction variables and this usually causes 
multicollinearity problem which usually makes the coefficients of the regressors 
inefficient. To check if multicollinearity problem exist, we calculate Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) for each regressor. In general, if VIF is more than 15, then 
multicollinearity problem exists. To addresss the problem, the variable causing 
multicollinearity needs to be removed from the equation. 
 
Since we employ panel data, for each empirical model, we conduct tests 
to determine whether the ordinary least squares (OLS), the fixed effect method 
(FEM), or the random effect method (REM) is the most appropriate method to 
use. To test if REM or FEM is better method to use, we employ the redundant 
fixed effect likelihood test. The test is also employed to determine if FEM covers 
both period and cross-section, cross-section only, or period only. To test if FEM 
or REM more appropriate, we use Haussman test.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of variables employed in the study. As 
shown by standard deviation, maximum and minimum values, the variations of 
the level of investments (INVTA), cash flow (CFTA), price to book value (PBV), 
assets turnover (SALESTA), financial leverage (DEBTRATIO), and change in 
net working capital are quite large, indicating that the samples are highly varied. 
 
The average cash flow rights (CFR) is 46.0%. Less than 20% of 
controlling shareholders have cash flow rights less than 20% while more than 
43% of them have cash flow rights more than 50%. The figures indicate that the 
ownership structure of listed companies in the sample firms is highly 
concentrated. The average cash flow leverage (CFL = the difference between 
control rights and cash flow rights) is 11.3%. Slightly more than 50% of the firms 
have cash flow leverage greater than zero. Thus, the use of pyramid structure is 
still common, as evidenced by the majority of firms have control rights exceeding 
cash flow rights. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables (n = 284) 
 
Variable Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
INVTA 0.022 0.126 0.741 –0.877 
PBV 1.938 3.517 21.767 0.082 
CFTA 0.070 0.130 0.668 –0.350 
SALESTA 1.269 1.324 15.887 0.024 
DELTAWCTA 0.195 0.271 0.856 –0.682 
DEBTRATIO 0.570 0.316 3.398 0.055 
CR 0.573 0.251 1.000 0.095 
CFR 0.460 0.248 0.971 0.042 
CFL 0.113 0.176 0.778 0.000 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 provides the coefficients of pearson correlations among the variables. 
Contrary to the expectation, the correlation between cash flow and investments is 
not significant. Consistent with expectation, PBV which proxies for investment 
opportunities has a significant positive correlation with the level of investment 
(loginvta) and the level of cash flow (CFTA). In addition, cash flow rights have a 
positive relation with PBV while cash flow leverage have a negative relation with 
PBV. These results are also consistent with the view that higher cash flow rights 
associate with a stronger alignment effect while higher cash flow leverage 
associate with a stronger entrenchment effect (i.e., more incentive to expropriate). 
 
Table 2 
Pearson correlations coefficients among variables 
 
 INVTA PBV CFTA SALESTA DELTANWC DEBTRATIO CR CFR 
PBV 0.156**        
CFTA 0.040 0.225**       
SALESTA 0.030 0.081 0.003      
DELTANWC 0.054 –0.201** 0.154** 0.161**     
DEBTRATIO –0.221** 0.051 –0.262** 0.059 –.0638**    
CR 0.005 0.170** 0.114 –0.090 –0.250** 0.072   
CFR 0.033 0.276** 0.284** 0.039 –0.069 0.018 0.753**  
CFL –0.038 –0.148* –0.238** –.0183** –0.260** 0.077 0.367** –0.336** 
  
Siginificant coefficients are indicated by * (10%  level), ** (5% level), *** (1% level). 
INVTA = Investments per total assets, PBV = Stock Price to Book Value of Equity per share, CFTA = Cash flow per total 
assets, SALESTA = Sales per total assets, DELTANWCTA = Change in net working capital per total assets, DEBTRATIO = 
Liabilites per total assets. 
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Regression Analysis 
 
The results of redundant fixed effect tests and Haussman tests consistently 
conclude that the most suitable method to use is the cross-section fixed effect 
method. Thus the results provided in the following tables are based on that 
method. 
 
Table 3 provides the results of the regression test that examines if 
positive investment-cash flow sensitivity exists during the period of the study 
(2005–2008). Table 3 shows that the coefficient of cash flow (CFTA) is not 
significantly positive, meaning that there is no evidence of positive investment-
cash flow sensitivity for the sample firms. This result is consistent with the 
finding of Chen and Chen (2012) who document no positive association between 
cash flow and investment during the similar period as our study (year 2005–
2008). They attribute the result is due to the weakening of information content of 
cash flow in reflecting future cash flow. They prove this by showing that the 
correlation coefficient between cash flow and Tobin’s Q that is measured 
similarly with our measure (PBV) has declined in the past 50 years. In 1970s the 
coefficient correlation was around 0.40 while in  2000s it was only around 0.15. 
As shown in Table 2, the coefficient correlation between cash flow and PBV is 
0.225, which is slightly higher than the correlation found by Chen and Chen 
(2012) but it is much lower than 0.40. Therefore, our finding of no positive 
relation between investment and cash flow may also be attributed to low 
information content of current cash flow reflecting future cash flow. 
 
Table 3 
Regression results of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  0.130 3.757 
CFTA + –0.116 –1.429 
PBV + 0.023*** 4.584 
SALESTA + 0.001 0.124 
DELTANWCTA + 0.079* 1.289 
DEBTRATIO – –0.282*** –7.046 
N 284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.333 
F-statistic 2.768*** 
 
Siginificant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), *** (1% level). 
INVTA = Investments per total assets, PBV = Stock Price to Book Value of Equity per share, CFTA = Cash 
flow per total assets, SALESTA = Sales per total assets, DELTANWCTA = Change in net working capital per 
total assets, DEBTRATIO = Liabilites per total assets. 
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 An alternative possible explanation is that in general agency problem and 
asymmetric problem have decreased so there is no positive association between 
investment and cash flow. As explained above, the decrease may be due to a 
number of initiatives that have been taken by the capital regulator to improve 
corporate governance practices of listed companies and to reduce capital market 
imperfections since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.  
 
 Except for SALESTA, all other control variables are significant in the 
expected direction. PBV, which signifies investment opportunities, has a positive 
effect on the level of investments. This indicates that firms with abundant 
investment opportunities invest more than those with poor investment 
opportunities. Change in net working capital (DELTANWCTA) has a marginally 
positive relation with the level of invesments, suggesting the need of both 
working capital and fixed assets concurrently. The level of debt (DEBTRATIO) 
has a strong negative relation with the level of invesments, indicating that firms 
with too much debt have lower level of investments. 
 
The second and third hyhpotheses examine the effect of cash flow rights 
and cash flow leverage on investment-cash flow sensitivity. If higher cash flow 
rights (cash flow leverage) lower (increases) the sensitivity, then these indicate 
that overinvestment problem tends to dominate underinvestment problem and 
vice versa. Wei and Zhang (2008) find evidence consistent with overinvestment 
problem during pre-financial crisis period in East Asia. Table 4 provides the 
results of testing the hypotheses. 
 
Table 4 
Results of regression of ownership structure on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient t-statistic 
C  0.133 3.881 
CFTA + 0.339** 1.746 
PBV + 0.023*** 4.719 
SALESTA + 0.002 0.193 
DELTANWCTA + 0.082* 1.323 
DEBTRATIO – –0.283*** –7.149 
CFR*CFTA –/+ –0.851*** –2.589 
CFL*CFTA –/+ –0.543 –0.874 
N 284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349 
F-statistic 2.848*** 
 
Siginificant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), *** (1% level). 
INVTA = Investments per total assets, PBV = Stock Price to Book Value of Equity per share, CFTA = Cash 
flow per total assets, SALESTA = Sales per total assets, DELTANWCTA = Change in net working capital per 
total assets, DEBTRATIO = Liabilites per total assets. 
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The coefficient of cash flow (CFTA) becomes positive and the 
coefficient of interaction between cash flow and cash flow rights (CFTA*CFR) is 
significantly negative; while the coefficient of interaction between cash flow and 
cash flow leverage (CFTA*CFL) is not significantly positive. Higher cash flow 
rights signify that the interests of controlling shareholders are more aligned with 
other shareholders and this alignment reduces the overinvestment problem. Based 
on the coefficients of CFTA and CFTA*CFR, we can calculate the coefficient of 
cash flow as a function of cash flow rights. Based on the calculation, we find that 
overinvestment problem tends to exist when cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders are very low (less than 15%).  
 
The results provide a weak support of the findings of Wei and Zhang 
(2008) that relative to underinvestment problem, overinvestment problem tends 
to be more of a problem in Indonesia. The possible explanation for the weak 
finding is that the enactment of a number of rules aiming at protecting the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders after the economic crisis in year 1998 
reduces the agency problem, i.e., it is more difficult for managers or controlling 
shareholders to expropriate wealth of non-controlling shareholders through 
among others overinvesting activities. Another possible explanation is that the 
counter effect of the asymmetric information problem (explained in hypothesis 
two) may partially offset the impact of the entrenchment effect on investment 
cash-flow sensitivity. 
 
The weak support also indicates that the existence of incentive to 
expropriate firms’ wealth may not necessarily result in overinvestment problem. 
This explanation is further investigated in the last empirical test.  
 
Next, we examine the impact of investment opportunities (as reflected in 
the ratio of Price to Book Value of Equity (PBV)) on the investment – cash flow 
sensitivity. As explained in the hypothesis development, if a higher PBV reduces 
the investment cash flow sensitivity, then overinvestment problem is the 
dominant problem in Indonesia. 
 
 The results of the test is shown in Table 5. The coefficient of interaction 
between cash flow and PBV is marginally negative, suggesting that firms with 
high investment opportunities have lower investment cash flow sensitivity than 
those with lower investment opportunities. Since firms with low investment 
opportunities tend to have overinvestment problem, this finding is consistent with 
the finding of previous test, i.e., overinvestment tends to dominate the 
underinvestment problem in Indonesia.  
 
The next test is to test Hypothesis 5, i.e., whether the interaction between 
investment opportunites and ownership structure has a significant impact on 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity. According to the hypothesis, overinvestment 
problem primarily exists in firms with low investment opportunities and whose 
controlling shareholders have strong incentive to expropriate firms’ wealth.  
 
When we run the full model (Equation 4) and test the existence of 
multicollinearity problem, we find that the VIFs for all variables (except for 
control variables) are greater than 15. The VIFs for the three way interactions 
variables are more 400, indicating the occurence of a severe multicollinearity 
problem. To overcome this problem we need to remove variables causing 
multicollinearity. We remove Cash Flow (CFTA) and the VIFs drop to below 15. 
 
Table 5 
Regression results of investment opportunities on investment- cash flow sensitivity 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient t-Statistic 
C  0.124 3.563 
CFTA  –0.062 –0.679 
PBV + 0.027*** 4.607 
SALESTA + 0.001 0.108 
DELTANWCTA + 0.089* 1.446 
DEBTRATIO + –0.282*** –7.059 
PBV*CFTA – –0.031* –1.305 
N 284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.336 
F-statistic 2.765*** 
 
Siginificant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), *** (1% level). 
INVTA = Investments per total assets, PBV = Stock Price to Book Value of Equity per share, CFTA = Cash 
flow per total assets, SALESTA = Sales per total assets, DELTANWCTA = Change in net working capital per 
total assets, DEBTRATIO = Liabilites per total assets. 
  
Table 6 provides the results of the regression to test hypothesis five using 
the full model and the model after removing CFTA. The coefficient of two way 
interaction between cash flow and cash flow right (CFTA*CFR) is significantly 
negative in both model while the coefficient of the three way interaction between 
cash flow, cash flow right, and PBV (CFTA*CFL*PBV) is not significant. The 
results indicate that the negative impact of cash flow right on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is not affected by investment opportunities. Thus, firms whose 
controlling shareholders have low ownership (i.e., low cash flow rights) tend to 
overinvest regardless the level of investment opportunities. 
 
The coefficient of two way interaction between cash flow and cash flow 
leverage (CFTA*CFL) is not significant under the full model while it is 
marginally positive under the reduced model. The coefficient of the three way 
interaction between cash flow, cash flow leverage, and PBV (CFTA*CFL*PBV) 
is significantly negative under both models. The results show that as firms have 
more investment opportunities (i.e., PBV gets higher), the positive impact of cash 
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flow leverage on investment-cash flow sensitivity disappears. Thus, in line with 
our hypothesis, under abundant investment opportunities, firms whose controlling 
shareholders have high incentive to expropriate tend not to overinvest. 
 
These findings may explain the weak findings of hypothesis two and 
three. The findings suggest that firms with high incentive to expropriate do not 
necessarily overinvest. These firms will overinvest only when they have few 
investment opportunities. The period of our sample covers year 2005 until year 
2008 and during this period Indonesia’s economy managed to grow almost 6% 
per year. Under this condusive investment environment, only few companies 
experience low investment opportunities and as a result, the effect of ownership 
structure on investment-cash flow sensitivity is relatively weak.  
 
Table 6  
Results of the regression of the interaction between ownership structure and investment 
opportunities on investment cash flow sensitivity 
 
Variable Expected Sign 
Full Model Model  without CFTA 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C  0.121 3.513 0.123 3.592 
CFTA + 0.287* 1.473 
  
PBV + 0.026*** 4.632 0.027*** 4.685 
SALESTA + 0.002 0.157 0.001 0.111 
DELTANWCTA + 0.102** 1.668 0.103*** 1.675 
DEBTRATIO – –0.277*** –7.018 –0.278*** –7.059 
CFR*CFTA –/+ –0.724** –2.093 –0.284** –1.621 
CFL*CFTA –/+ 0.558 0.696 1.018*** 1.377 
CFR*CFTA*PBV –/+ –0.016 –0.555 –0.020 –0.717 
CFL*CFTA*PBV –/+ –0.772** –2.181 –0.823*** –2.328 
N  284 284 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 0.358 0.355 
F-statistic  2.882*** 2.874*** 
 
Siginificant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5%), *** (1% level). 
INVTA = Investments per total assets, PBV = Stock Price to Book Value of Equity per share, CFTA = Cash 
flow per total assets, SALESTA = Sales per total assets, DELTANWCTA = Change in net working capital per 
total assets, DEBTRATIO = Liabilites per total assets. 
 
 Our findings extend the study of Wei and Zhang (2010) that find 
ownership structure (represented by cash flow rights and control rights) affect 
investment cash flow sensitivity and that overinvestment problem exist for firms 
whose controlling shareholders have high incentive to expropriate (i.e., low cash 
Interaction between Incentive to Expropriate and Investment Opportunities 
95 
flow right and high cash flow leverage). Our findings show that firms whose 
controlling shareholders have high incentive to expropriate do not necessarily 
overinvest, i.e., it depends on the level of investment opportunities: only those 
firms with high incentive to expropriate and low investment opportunities tend to 
overinvest. Our study also extends Degryse and de Jong (2006) since we 
demonstrate that investment opportunities not only have direct effect but also 
indirect effect (through its interaction with ownership structure) on investment 
cash flow sensitivity. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We examine if after significant capital market reforms in Indonesia, positive 
investment-cash flow sensitivity still exists for listed companies in Indonesia. We 
also investigate if the effect of ownership structure on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity depends on the level of investment opportunities. The ownership 
structure is reflected by cash flow rights which measure the  incentive alignment 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders and cash flow leverage, 
which measure the incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate firms’ 
wealth.  
 
 Using a sample of firms in East Asia before the financial crisis of 1998, 
Wei and Zhang (2008) find that firms with low cash flow rights and high cash 
flow leverage tend to overinvest, which represents one form of agency problem. 
Under the condition of capital constraints, we posit that this effect may not hold 
for firms with high invesment opportunities since controlling shareholders of 
these firms have less need to expropriate. 
 
 We find that there is no positive relation between investment and cash 
flow, indicating either the existence of low information content of cash flow or 
that in general over or underinvestment problem is not occurring for 
manufacturing listed firms in Indonesia. We do find that overinvestment 
primarily exists for firms whose controlling shareholders have small ownership in 
the listed firms. Futher,  in line with the findings of Degryse and Jong (2006), we 
document that higher investment opportunities reduce investment cash flow 
sensitivity, suggesting that overinvestment relatively still dominates 
underinvestment among listed manufacturing companies in Indonesia.  
 
In line with our expectation, we find that higher investment opportunities 
reduce the effect of expropriation incentive on the level of overinvestment. This 
result may explain the weak evidence of overinvestment in Indonesia, i.e., under 
condusive economic environment, a large number of firms have good investment 
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opportunities, including those having large expropriation incentive, and as a 
result these firms do not overinvest. 
 
The implications of the study are as follows. Government or investors 
that want to identify firms with high risk of overinvestment  need to look at firms 
whose controlling shareholders have low ownership or firms with low investment 
opportunities and whose controlling shareholders have high incentive to 
expropriate. The internal control mechanism of these firms requires an 
independent committee that closely reviews and oversees investment activities of 
the firms while the investment activities should be transparently disclosed. 
 
The followings are some limitations of the study and the avenues for 
future research: first, our study covers only Indonesia and thus, to assure the 
external validity of the findings, future studies need to extend it to other 
countries, for example the countries employed by Wei and Zhang (2008). 
Second, the number of observations in this study is rather low primarily due to 
limited data on cash-flow rights and control rights of the controlling shareholders. 
Many of the firms have to be removed from the sample because the domiciles of 
the controlling shareholders are overseas, making the tracking of the ultimate 
owners and their control and cash-flow rights impossible. Therefore, extending 
the period of the study for the existing observations can increase the number of 
observations. In addition, the extended period of the study will also cover period 
during economic slump. During this period investment opportunities are lower, 
therefore we expect that the effect of expropriation incentive on overinvestment 
is stronger during this period. Third, we posit that corporate governance reforms 
in Indonesia in the past ten years may explain the decrease in the level of 
overinvestments of listed companies in Indonesia; however,  our study does not 
directly include corporate governance practice as one possible mitigating factor 
of overinvestment. Therefore, we suggest that future research needs to examine if 
corporate governance mechanism can reduce the level of investment and it may 
also reduce the effect of expropriation incentive on the level of overinvestments. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Reports on the results of corporate governance country assessments 
conducted by the World can be accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/ 
ifa/rosc_cg.html 
2. Pyramid ownership structure results in the divergence of control rights 
over cash flow rights.  The average cash-flow or ownership rights of the 
largest shareholders in our sample firms is 44% while the average control 
rights is 56%. 
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3. For example, the results of survey conducted by CLSA (2012) show that 
corporate governance score in Indonesia ranks the lowest among 12 East 
Asian countries covered by the survey.  One component that contributes 
to the low score is the lack of enforcement of the rules. 
4. The Indonesian Financial Services Authority (FSA) currently is 
developing a CG Code for publicly listed companies and once it is 
launched, FSA will impose the Comply or Explain rule on all listed 
companies (i.e. companies have to publicly state if they fully comply 
with the code; if some items in the code are not complied with, 
companies have to provide reason for non-compliance. 
5. R&D expenditures for majority of manufacturing listed firms are not 
disclosed in the notes to financial statements, indicating that the 
expenditures are relatively small. 
6. Based on the corporate governance country assessment by the World 
Bank (2010), the score of Disclosure and Transparency principle for 
Indonesia in year 2009 (73) is lower than those of India (84 in year 
2004), Malaysia (87 in year 2005), and Thailand (81 in year 2005). 
7. According to the World Development Indicators, during year 2005–2008, 
the average interest rate spread between borrowing and deposit in 
Indonesia was 5.4% while the figures were 4.6%, 3.9%, and 3.1% for the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia respectively. 
8. The ownership data from year 2005 to year 2007 reveals that changes in 
ownership are very rare; therefore, we are quite confidence that 
ownership data in year 2008 is quite valid. 
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